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There is now a large and growing literature analyzing the factors that determine 
whether entrepreneurs raise venture capital funding (Hellmann and Puri [2000]; Burton, 
Sørensen, and Beckman [2002]) and the factors that affect the terms of this financing 
(Gompers [1997], Kaplan and Stromberg [2002]).  There is much less understanding of 
how these venture capital backed entrepreneurs come to be entrepreneurs in the first 
place. In this paper, we try to fill this gap by examining the factors that lead to the 
creation of venture capital backed entrepreneurs, a process we term “entrepreneurial 
spawning.”  
We contrast two alternative views of the spawning process.  In one view, 
employees of established firms are trained and conditioned to be entrepreneurs by being 
exposed to the entrepreneurial process and by working in a network of entrepreneurs and 
venture capitalists.  The prolific spawning of entrepreneurial firms by Fairchild 
Semiconductors and its descendents is a prominent example of “how entrepreneurial 
learning and networks may function,” as Saxenian [1994] writes.  Fairchild was founded 
by eight engineers who left Shockley Semiconductor with $1.5 million in venture capital 
funding from Arthur Rock, one of the earliest (and later most successful) venture 
capitalists.   While the “Treacherous Eight” succeeded as inventors of the first integrated 
circuit in 1959, the founders and other engineers soon began to leave Fairchild to begin 
firms of their own.  Between 1957 and 1976, at least 23 out of 67 entrants to the 
semiconductor industry had at least one founder who worked for Fairchild (Braun and 
Macdonald [1982]), including Advanced Micro Devices, Intel, and National 
Semiconductor, almost all of which were based in Silicon Valley.   3 
 
In this view, individuals already working for entrepreneurial firms, particularly 
those already backed by venture capitalists and located in hotbeds of venture capital 
activity—notably Silicon Valley and Massachusetts—may find launching their own 
venture less daunting than others might.  This may be the case for a number of reasons.  
First, working in such firms exposes would-be entrepreneurs to a network of suppliers of 
labor, goods, and capital, as well as a network of customers (Saxenian [1994]).  Because 
starting a new venture requires suppliers and customers to make relationship-specific 
investments before it is guaranteed that the venture will get off the ground, networks can 
be particularly useful in alleviating this chicken-and-egg problem (Hellmann [2002]).  
Second, would-be entrepreneurs learn how to found companies by participating in the 
entrepreneurial process alongside other, more experienced entrepreneurs.  Finally, 
individuals with a higher taste for risky activities may have already found their way to 
entrepreneurial firms, consistent with the sorting processes hypothesized by Jovanovic 
[1979], Holmes and Schmidt [1990] and Gromb and Scharfstein [2002].  We refer to this 
depiction of entrepreneurial spawning as the “Fairchild view.” 
  An alternative view of the entrepreneurial spawning process is that individuals 
become entrepreneurs because the large bureaucratic companies for which they work are 
reluctant to fund their entrepreneurial ideas.  The most prominent example of this is 
Xerox, which developed many of the key technologies underlying the personal computer, 
but which failed to commercialize these technologies (summarized in Hunt and Lerner 
[1995]).  In 1969, Xerox chief executive Peter McColough commissioned the firm’s head 
of research to build a new laboratory to provide the company with the technology to 
move the firm from being the leading office copier company to being the dominant   4 
 
supplier of information-intensive products (Chesbrough [2002]).  The Palo Alto Research 
Center (PARC) was formed to house this group in 1970.  The firm hired outstanding 
researchers for this new technical initiative, including physicists, mathematicians, 
materials scientists, computer system architects, and software engineers.  PARC proved 
to be enormously fertile, inventing such technologies as laser printing, the Ethernet, the 
graphical user interface, and personal distributed computing.  Despite appeals by PARC 
leaders to invest in commercializing these innovations, the firm’s Rochester, New York-
based executives resisted such expenditures.  Instead, the vast bulk of the value from 
these inventions was captured by employees who left Xerox to found companies such as 
Adobe Systems and 3Com as well as licensees such as Apple Computer. 
There are at least three reasons that large, established firms might be more prone 
to spawn entrepreneurial ventures.  We will refer to this as the “Xerox view” of 
entrepreneurial spawning.  First, it may be that firms are incapable of responding to 
radical technological changes that upset the established ways of organizing their 
businesses.  Christensen [1997], perhaps the most visible proponent of this view, has 
written about the failure of companies to capitalize on “disruptive technologies”:   
Why was it that firms that could be esteemed as aggressive, innovative, 
customer-sensitive organizations could ignore or attend belatedly to 
technological innovations with enormous strategic importance?  … 
Finding new applications and markets for new products seems to be a 
capability that each of these firms exhibited once, upon entry, and then 
apparently lost.  It was as if the leading firms were held captive by their 
customers, enabling attacking entrant firms to topple the incumbent 
industry leaders each time a disruptive technology emerged (Christensen 
[1997], p. 24). 
 
Henderson [1993] presents evidence of the organizational incapacity of firms to respond 
to technological change. Using data from the semiconductor photolithography industry,   5 
 
she shows that incumbents were consistently slower than entrants in developing and 
introducing new technologies. 
  A second, related reason why large, established companies may spawn more is 
that high-level managers at these firms are incapable of evaluating these entrepreneurial 
opportunities because they fall outside the company’s core line of business.  Assessing 
these opportunities may also require the analysis of “soft information,” which 
hierarchical organizations may have a hard time doing (Stein [2002]; Berger, et al. 
[2002]).  Moreover, the internal capital market tends to favor established lines of business 
over less established, but perhaps more promising, businesses (Scharfstein [1998]; 
Scharfstein and Stein [2000]). These arguments suggest that a considerable amount of 
entrepreneurial spawning should come from large established firms, where these 
problems are presumably most severe.  
  Finally, it is also possible that the level of entrepreneurial spawning would be 
high among these firms not because of any sort of inefficiency at these firms, but rather 
because these firms wisely choose to focus on their core business or “core competence.” 
The wisdom of focusing on one’s “core competence,” has been a mainstay of 
management consulting since the 1980s. It is also supported by the findings that: 
•  diversified firms tend to trade at a discount to a portfolio of comparable focused 
firms (Berger and Ofek [1995]); 
•  firms that diversified excessively during the 1960s and 1970s were more likely to 
be acquired and broken up in the subsequent two decades (Mitchell and Lehn 
[1990]); and    6 
 
•  when firms diversified into unrelated businesses, the productivity of their existing 
businesses declined (Schoar [2002]). 
Thus, in this view, even though good entrepreneurial ideas might be germinated at these 
firms, management wisely chooses not to develop them because it would do more harm 
than good to their core businesses.  
This paper is an empirical exploration of the Fairchild and Xerox views of the 
entrepreneurial spawning process. To analyze these perspectives on spawning, we 
assemble a database of employees who leave public companies to start venture capital 
backed firms during the period 1986-1999. From these data, we are able to calculate the 
spawning levels of public companies. We then relate these spawning levels to firm 
characteristics in a cross-sectional analysis and examine how these spawning levels 
change over time for particular firms. 
Controlling for firm size, patent portfolio, and industry, we find that the most 
prolific spawning firms from 1986 to 1999 were public companies located in Silicon 
Valley and Massachusetts that were once venture capital backed themselves.  These 
effects are substantial: being located in Silicon Valley increases the spawning level by 
almost 38%; companies in Massachusetts have a 23% higher spawning level; and 
companies that were once venture capital backed have a 23% higher spawning level.  
Diversified firms appear to spawn less, not more.  Firms focused in one segment 
have spawning levels 19% higher than those operating in multiple segments. Moreover, 
after controlling for the quantity, quality, and originality of patents that firms have in the 
areas of principal interest to venture capitalists (computers and communication as well as 
drugs and medical), the existence of other types of patents in the portfolio (e.g.,   7 
 
mechanical patents) tends to reduce a company’s spawning level.  This result is 
inconsistent with the notion that more diversified firms will spawn more. Our findings 
appear to be more consistent with the notion that diversified firms are less entrepreneurial 
and thus less prone to have the sorts of people who would have the inclination, ability, or 
skills to start new venture capital backed firms. 
The penultimate empirical section of the paper examines how spawning levels 
change over time for firms.  Thus, we construct a panel of annual spawning levels for 
firms with patents in areas of interest to venture capitalists.  When we use firm fixed 
effects in our regression analysis, we find that firm spawning levels are lower when a 
firm’s past sales growth is high relative to the firm’s mean level of growth.  We interpret 
this finding as indicating that when firms are growing rapidly, employees choose to stay 
at their firms (and perhaps develop their entrepreneurial ideas internally) because they 
perceive the rents from doing so to be high.  When growth slows, however, employees 
are more prone to seek entrepreneurial opportunities outside the firm.  
One competing interpretation of our findings is that venture capital backed firms 
in Silicon Valley and Massachusetts with a history of venture capital backing have high 
spawning levels not because of entrepreneurial learning, networks, or attributes, but 
simply because they have technologies and operate in businesses that are of more interest 
to venture capitalists in the first place (as, for instance, the tabulations in Kortum and 
Lerner [2000] suggest).  While this remains a possible explanation, it is worth noting that 
we have controlled extensively for patent characteristics (quantity, class, quality, and 
originality) and industry.  Thus, if high spawners simply function in fields of greater   8 
 
relevance to venture capitalists, they must do so in a way that is neither observable to us 
nor captured by our patent and industry controls.  
As a further check to see that our results are not driven by technology differences, 
we examine the extent to which venture capital backed start-ups pursue businesses related 
to those of the firms from which they are spawned. If technology differences underlie our 
results, we would expect to see more related spawning from the high spawners.   
However, this is not what we observe in our empirical analysis.  We find, instead, that 
firms located in Silicon Valley and Massachusetts with prior venture capital backing 
spawn less related businesses.   
This finding also sheds some light on the causes of entrepreneurial spawning.  
The results do not appear to be consistent with Xerox-type spawning because we would 
expect less related spawning from large, established firms for the reasons discussed 
above, i.e., the inability of the firms to evaluate technologies outside their core business 
or the commitment on the part of these firms to focus on their core business.  Instead, the 
findings appear to be more consistent with the view that these firms are unable or 
unwilling to take advantage of entrepreneurial opportunities in their core business 
(perhaps because of fear of cannibalization).  By contrast, the high spawners in Silicon 
Valley and Massachusetts are more prone to spawn outside their core and would appear 
to be capitalizing on opportunities in their core lines of business.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I describes the construction 
of the data set and summarizes the data.  The analysis is presented in Section II.  Section 
III concludes the paper, discusses some implications of our findings, and highlights other 
research opportunities in this area.   9 
 
 
I.  Constructing the Data Set 
The core data for the analysis come from VentureOne.  VentureOne, established in 
1987, collects data on firms that have obtained venture capital financing.  Firms that have 
received early-stage financing exclusively from individual investors, federally chartered 
Small Business Investment Companies, and corporate development groups are not included 
in the database. 
The companies are initially identified from a wide variety of sources, including trade 
publications, company Web pages, and telephone contacts with venture investors.   
VentureOne then collects information about the businesses through interviews with venture 
capitalists and entrepreneurs. The data collected include the identity of the key founders (the 
crucial information used here) as well as the industry, strategy, employment, financial 
history and revenues of the firm.  Data on the firms are updated and validated through 
monthly contacts with investors and firms.   
For the purposes of this analysis, we examine the founders and initial executive 
officers (henceforth referred to as “entrepreneurs”) that joined firms listed in the 
VentureOne database during the period from 1986 and 1999.
1  Typically, the database 
reported the previous affiliation and title (at the previous employer) of these entrepreneurs, 
                                                 
1We did not include events in earlier periods because of concerns about selection biases.  
VentureOne has “back-filled” data on entrepreneurial firms through the early 1980s, but 
firms that did not survive until 1987 were not added to the database.  At the time this 
study was initiated, the 2000 and 2001 data were substantially less complete than the 
other years due to lags in identifying and surveying firms.   10 
 
as well as the date they joined the firm.
2  In some cases, however, VentureOne did not 
collect this information.  In these cases, we attempt to find this information by examining 
contemporaneous news stories in LEXIS-NEXIS, securities filings, and web sites of 
surviving firms.
3  We believe this data-collection procedure may introduce a bias in favor of 
having more information on successful firms, but it is not apparent to us that it affects our 
analysis.  
Table I summarizes the population of entrepreneurs and their venture capital backed 
start-up firms.  First, the table presents the number of entrepreneurs that joined new venture 
capital backed companies in the VentureOne database by the year that they joined those 
venture-backed firms, as well the number of new venture capital backed firms that these 
entrepreneurs joined in each year.  We also list the number of venture capital backed 
technology companies.    We then present the number of entrepreneurs who held at least one 
of three key titles in the new company—CEO, president, and chief technical officer 
(CTO)—as well as the count of entrepreneurs who left firms that were publicly traded.  
Finally, we report the share of entrepreneurs that were from entities that were publicly 
traded at the time of their departure. 
Two observations should be highlighted from the summary statistics.  First, the level 
of activity has risen over the period, reflecting the more general growth of the venture 
                                                 
2We code the entrepreneur as being spawned from the most recent company for which he 
worked, even though he may have a wealth of experience working at other types of 
companies.   
 
3When we were unable to ascertain the year in which the individual joined the firm, we 
used the year in which the firm was formed, which was the modal answer in cases where 
we had complete data.  This approach does introduce some empirical difficulties, as we 
discuss below.  
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capital industry over these years.
4 The number of entrepreneurs joining venture capital 
backed start-ups increases from 483 in 1986 to 1717 in 1999.  Similarly, the number of 
distinct venture capital backed firms represented in the sample increases from 218 in 1986 to 
799 in 1999.   Second, the share of entrepreneurs that emerge from publicly traded firms is 
significant.  The first measure we report calculates the share as a percentage of all 
entrepreneurs.  This measure suggests that there has been an increase of about 40% over this 
period in the share of entrepreneurs coming from public companies (from 30% to 42% of 
the entire sample of entrepreneurs). There are many entrepreneurs, however, for which the 
database reports no prior work history.  If one excludes these entrepreneurs from the 
calculation, the share of entrepreneurs coming from public companies appears more stable, 
averaging approximately 45% per year.  The difference in these findings is probably 
attributable to the more complete reporting of prior work histories in later years.     
The data on entrepreneurs are linked to information on the companies that spawned 
them.  In particular, we determine whether the entrepreneur had previously been employed 
at a publicly traded firm in the United States, and, if so, we link it to the appropriate firm in 
the Compustat and Center for Research into Securities Prices (CRSP) databases.  We also 
identify the spawning firm’s patents (and their characteristics) using the National Bureau of 
Economic Research’s (NBER) Patent Citations Data File (summarized in Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg [2001]).  This database links patent data from the U.S. Patent Office to 
                                                 
4The reader may be puzzled that the volume of spawned venture capital backed start-ups 
falls in 1999, a record year for venture capital activity.  This decline occurs because the 
years reported are those where the entrepreneurs joined the new firms, not the year of 
first venture capital financing.  Thus, even though many more entrepreneurs may have 
joined start-ups in 1999, it is likely that a smaller percentage of them were later funded 
by venture capital because of the plunge in the NASDAQ in April 2000 and the 
subsequent drop in overall venture capital funding.    12 
 
Compustat (as it was comprised in 1989).  We add links for companies listed in Compustat 
after 1989.
5  
Table II lists the firms and industries that were most active in spawning new firms.  
Panel A lists the 48 publicly traded corporations that spawned ten or more entrepreneurial 
teams during the sample period. (Multiple individuals departing to establish a firm are 
regarded as a single team).  Panel B describes the top three-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes in which the most spawners operated.  (Each firm is assigned to 
one three-digit SIC code, based on the primary industry assigned in Compustat.)   The 
dominant importance of firms in the software, computer and office equipment, and drug 
industries is apparent.  The concentration of entrepreneurs spawned from public firms in 
these industries closely mirrors the overall investment pattern of the venture capital industry.  
It is not surprising that the venture capitalists would finance entrepreneurs with relevant 
technology experience.  
Table III compares spawning firms to non-spawning firms. We take averages for 
each company that ever spawned a venture capital backed start-up in the VentureOne 
database during these years: i.e., those that spawned at least one entrepreneur over the time 
period.  We contrast these firms to those that spawned no venture capital backed firms. For 
the purposes of interpreting our later results, we report summary data only on those firms 
that end up in our basic regression analysis. 
                                                                                                                                                 
  
5Because there are a very large number of companies listed in the patent database, it was 
not feasible to scan the entire database for possible links to Compustat.  Thus, we listed 
all companies in the patent database with at least two patents in the computers and 
communication and medical and drugs patent categories and narrowed our search of 
public companies to this subset of patent holders.  
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The tabulation reveals that spawning firms tend to be significantly larger than non-
spawners.  For instance, the median spawning firm has 60% higher sales, 90% greater 
assets, and 170% more employees.  Tobin’s Q is calculated as the ratio of the market value 
of the firm to the book value of its assets, following the procedure delineated in Kaplan and 
Zingales [1997]. Because the distribution of Tobin’s Q has a dramatic rightward skew, we 
report winsorized versions of this measure, cutting off the distribution at a Q of 10, roughly 
corresponding to the 99
th percentile.  The mean Q of spawning companies (2.75) is 
somewhat higher than the mean Q of non-spawning firms (2.54). The difference in the 
medians is much larger: 2.18 versus 1.71. The average EBITDA to assets ratio is not 
appreciably different across the two sub-samples but sales growth is considerably higher 
among the spawning firms.
6    
In addition to looking at differences in the financial performance of spawning and 
non-spawning firms, we also tabulate whether the headquarters of these firms are in Silicon 
Valley or Massachusetts.   Prior venture capital backing is determined by linking the 
companies to the Venture Economics database of venture capital financings (discussed in 
Gompers and Lerner [1999]), and then supplemented with the annual listing of venture 
capital backed IPOs in Venture Capital Journal.  Following Saxenian [1994], we define 
Silicon Valley as California’s Alameda, San Mateo, and Santa Clara counties. Although 
the hub of start-up activity in Massachusetts is around Route 128 (Middlesex County), the 
state is small enough that it is not meaningful to make distinctions among the counties of 
Massachusetts.  We determine the headquarters’ location from Compustat.   Spawning firms 
                                                 
6These measures are also winsorized. In the case of EBITDA to assets we cut off any 
ratios below -0.5 and above 0.5 and in the case of sales growth we cut off any rates above 
10.   14 
 
are much more likely to have been venture capital backed themselves (35.5% vs. 12.2%) 
and to be located in the hubs of venture capital activity, Silicon Valley and Massachusetts. 
The table also lists information on the degree of focus of the spawning and non-
spawning firms.  We consider a firm focused if it reports just one industry segment in its 
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
7  Spawning firms tend to be more 
focused even though they are substantially larger. 
Not surprisingly, spawning firms have considerably more patents over the period 
from 1980 to 1999, particularly in patent classes that are most relevant to venture capital,  
i.e., patents with a primary assignment to category 2, “Computers and Communications,” or 
category 3, “Drugs and Medical,” using the classification scheme in the NBER data file. 
Finally, the table reports information on the average quality and originality of 
patents in categories 2 and 3 for these companies.  The standard measure of patent quality 
(see the extended discussion in Jaffe and Trajtenberg [2002]) is the number of citations the 
patent receives.  We use this citation measure of quality, adjusting for the year in which the 
patent was granted and the sub-category of the patent.
8   Thus, our quality measure is the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
7There are a number of limitations of this focus measure.  One is that firms have discretion 
in what businesses they choose to lump together into a business segment.   Thus, some 
single-segment firms that pool a number of businesses into one segment may be no more 
focused than a multi-segment firm that breaks them out.  Another limitation is that some of 
the multiple segment firms may have quite related businesses across different segments.  
Our measure takes no account of those relationships.  Despite this measurement error, it is 
likely that on average the firms we categorize as focused will indeed be more focused than 
the other firms in the sample.   
 
8 The NBER database includes four subcategories for Computers and Communications: 
“Communications, “Computer Hardware and Software,” “Computer Peripherals,” and 
“Information Storage.”  There are four sub-categories for Drugs and Medical: “Drugs,” 
“Surgery and Medical Instruments,” “Biotechnology,” and “Miscellaneous.” 
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firm fixed effect in a regression of a patent’s citations on a set of dummy variables for the 
year in which the patent was granted and the patent sub-category.  The table indicates that 
the average patent quality of spawning firms is higher than that of non-spawning firms. 
Recent research (summarized in Jaffe and Trajtenberg [2002]) has highlighted the 
importance of the measure of patent originality.  A patent is considered more original if it 
cites patents across more patent categories, as it is more likely to synthesize knowledge 
across a variety of disciplines.  We use this measure reported in the NBER Patent Citations 
Data File, again adjusting for the granting year of the patent and the patent’s sub-category.  
The table shows that the average originality of patents held by spawning firms is lower than 
that of non-spawning firms.  
 
II. Analysis 
We present the results here in five sub-sections.  We start in sub-section II.A by 
analyzing the factors that affect the total number of venture capital backed start-ups that 
public companies spawn over the entire sample period, 1986-1999.    In the next two sub-
sections, II.B and II.C, we examine the extensive and intensive margins of spawning—
i.e., the factors that determine whether a firm spawns at all and the factors that determine 
how much spawning a firm undertakes conditional on spawning at least one firm.  We 
then examine in sub-section II.D whether the factors that explain overall spawning levels 
explain spawning levels on a yearly basis. In this sub-section, we also look at the annual 
spawning levels in a model with firm fixed effects.  Thus, we are able in this part of the 
paper to examine the time-varying characteristics that affect whether a firm’s spawning   16 
 
level is above or below its own mean.  In subsection II.E, we examine the extent to which 
the activities of the spawned firms are related to their parents. 
 
A.  The Determinants of Total Spawning 
In this section, we analyze the factors that affect the total number of venture 
capital backed companies spawned by public companies during the sample period 1986-
1999.  One issue that we face from the outset is that some firms will have very little 
spawning activity simply because they specialize in areas that are of little interest to 
venture capitalists.  Indeed, historically, more than 80% of venture capital disbursements 
have gone to firms in the information technology and health-related fields.  Thus, for the 
bulk of the analysis, we restrict our analysis to firms who were awarded at least one 
patent between 1981 and 1999 in NBER patent categories 2 (computer and 
communications) or 3 (drugs and medicine), which correspond to areas of greatest 
interest to venture capitalists. 
As the dependent variable, we use the logarithm of the number of venture capital 
backed start-ups that the firm spawns over the sample period (plus the number one to 
avoid dropping non-spawning firms).  When more than one person leaves a given 
company in a given year to form a particular firm, we still count it as one firm that was 
spawned.  In some of the analyses, we look only at spawning of start-ups in technology 
intensive businesses for which the patents in categories 2 and 3 are most relevant.  As 
shown in Table I, these spawned firms account for roughly two-thirds of the companies 
spawned in a given year.   17 
 
We start by looking at overall spawning because of our inability to identify the 
spawning date with certainty for every venture capital backed company.  In many cases, 
VentureOne does not report the date on which the entrepreneur joined the start-up. In 
these cases, we tried to fill in this information from publicly available information, but in 
many of them, we were unsuccessful.  When we could not find the information from 
other sources, we used the founding date of the start-up.  There are, however, a number of 
cases in which the founding date of the company precedes the founding date of the public 
company, indicating that the entrepreneur most likely joined at a later time.  These 
observations are dropped from the analysis when annual spawning levels are analyzed.  
This tends to disproportionately reduce the measured spawning levels of young public 
companies. Of course, looking at overall spawning levels has its own limitations, the 
most important of which is that it does not allow us to examine the time dynamics of 
spawning.  Since there is no perfect solution to this problem, we analyze the determinants 
of total spawning levels here and annual spawning levels in sub-section II.D below. 
The first column of Table IV reports the results of a cross-sectional regression in 
which the dependent variable is the log of a firm’s total spawning.  The mean of this 
variable is 0.482, indicating that the average firm spawns 0.619 firms between 1986 and 
1999.  The regressors in this analysis are: (1) the log of the total number of patents the 
firm was granted between 1981 and 1999 in each of the six NBER patent categories (as 
described in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg [2001]); (2) the mean of logarithm of the firm’s 
assets over the sample period expressed in 1996 dollars; (3) the mean ratio of EBITDA to 
assets; (4) the mean annual growth of real sales; (5) the mean of annual Q; (6) a dummy 
variable that equals one if the firm was venture capital backed; (7) separate Silicon   18 
 
Valley and Massachusetts dummies; (8) the mean of the firm’s focus dummy; (9) the 
quality of patents in categories 2 and 3; and (10) the originality of the patents in 
categories 2 and 3.  Because the firms are in the sample for different numbers of years, 
we also include a set of dummy variables for each year the firm is in the sample.  The t-
statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors that allow for non-
independence of observations across firms within the same 2-digit SIC code. 
Not surprisingly, the coefficients of the patent quantities in categories 2 and 3 are 
positive and highly statistically significant.  The coefficient indicates that the elasticity of 
spawning with respect to patenting in category 2 is 0.235 and that the elasticity in 
category 3 is 0.141.  It is noteworthy also that this elasticity is less than one; doubling a 
company’s patents generates significantly less than twice as many spawned entities. 
There may be several explanations of this finding.  First, not all businesses are based on 
patents and technological know-how; patents may be irrelevant for these spawned 
entities.  Second, many patents may have no immediate practical business value. If larger 
firms with more patents are more likely to have such patents (perhaps because they have 
internal patent departments that reduce the cost of applying for patent awards, and thus 
make it worthwhile to apply for more marginal awards), the incremental impact of a 
patent on spawning activity could be lower.  A third possibility is that some patenting 
may be an attempt to limit the extent to which employees take their ideas and start new 
ventures.  Finally, to the extent that we have included other measures of size, such as the 
logarithm of real assets, these variables may be picking up some of the effect of an 
increase in patenting.           19 
 
 Interestingly, the coefficients on the other four patent categories are all negative 
and, in the case of mechanical patents (category 5) and other patents (category 6), they 
are statistically significant.  This finding suggests that having research activities outside 
of the main venture capital related areas reduces the level of spawning.  This is not 
consistent with the Xerox view that spawning is a consequence of corporate bureaucracy.  
It is, however, consistent with the Fairchild view to the extent that firms operating in 
multiple areas of research tend to be less entrepreneurial in style and attract a less 
entrepreneurial type of employee. We discuss this and related findings later in this 
section. 
The table also indicates that firms with more assets spawn more firms, which is 
not surprising given that the dependent variable is not size adjusted.  There is no 
statistically significant link between spawning and EBITDA over assets, nor with one-
year real sales growth.  High Q firms do, however, spawn more. There are many potential 
explanations for this finding.  One plausible explanation is that firms have high Q 
because they are expected to develop new businesses.  The ideas for these new businesses 
are generated by the firm’s employees and some of them may choose to develop the ideas 
on the outside, backed by venture capital.  
The coefficient of the venture capital dummy is positive, large and highly 
statistically significant. The estimate of 0.264 indicates that, all else equal, public 
companies that were once venture capital backed spawn 26.4% more firms than those that 
were not venture capital backed.  The coefficient of the Silicon Valley dummy indicates 
that public companies based in Silicon Valley spawn 37.7% more firms than those based 
outside the two hubs of venture capital activity. The coefficient estimate on the   20 
 
Massachusetts dummy is also large and statistically significant; while smaller than the 
effect of being in Silicon Valley, the effect is comparable in size to that of being venture 
capital backed. 
The result that venture capital backed firms spawn more is consistent with the 
Fairchild view of spawning.  In this view, employees of venture capital backed firms 
learn how to be entrepreneurs through the experience of working in an entrepreneurial 
environment. They may also have greater exposure to the network of suppliers of goods, 
capital, and labor, as well as customers.  Furthermore, employees that select into venture 
capital backed firms may be less risk averse, and thus more willing to accept the risks 
associated with starting a new company. While it is difficult to determine the precise 
mechanism through which employment at a venture capital backed firm affects the 
amount of spawning, the effect is quite strong in the data.  The finding does not appear to 
be consistent with the alternative Xerox view of spawning.     
The positive effect of being located in Silicon Valley and Massachusetts is also 
consistent with the Fairchild view.  In both regions, employees have a closer connection 
to a network of suppliers of goods, capital and labor that is critical to the creation of a 
new enterprise.  Saxenian [1994] argues that being located in a region with other small 
entrepreneurial firms makes it easier to find companies that are willing to supply critical 
inputs. She argues that this effect is stronger in Silicon Valley than in Massachusetts 
because the latter region tends to have larger, more vertically integrated firms.  Although 
we estimate a larger effect in Silicon Valley than in Massachusetts, it would be a stretch 
to say that we have confirmation of Saxenian’s claim.     21 
 
  We also find that a firm’s average level of focus is positively related to the extent 
of its spawning.  The estimated effect is also quite large.  A firm that is focused 
throughout the sample period spawns 20% more than a company that is diversified 
throughout.  This finding appears at odds with the view that spawning is a response to 
bureaucratic rigidities in large, technology-intensive firms.  The result appears more 
consistent with the Fairchild view. 
  The regression results also indicate that older public companies spawn fewer 
venture capital backed start-ups.  The estimated elasticity of 5.8% is small. Given the 
imprecision with which we measure firm age, these results need to be interpreted with 
some caution. 
  Finally, the regression includes measures of patent quality and originality.  Firms 
with higher quality patents in categories 2 and 3 appear to spawn more, while those with 
lower average originality appear to spawn less. The coefficient of patent quality is 
statistically significant, while the coefficient of patent originality is not.   An increase 
from the 25
th percentile of quality to the 75
th percentile—an increase of 6.3 adjusted 
citations—leads to an increase of 2.8% in the level of spawning, a small effect.  Like the 
age effect, the estimated effect of patent quality is rather unimpressive.   
The second set of regressions in Table IV uses spawning in technology industries 
as the dependent variable.  We find the same basic patterns of results here as we did in 
the regression with overall spawning.  The last two columns repeat the first two but add 
industry dummies for two-digit SIC codes.  The key findings are unaffected: the 
coefficients of the venture capital, Silicon Valley, and Massachusetts dummies and the 
coefficient of average focus all remain positive and statistically significant.  The   22 
 
magnitudes of the coefficients also change very little.  Mean Q, age, and patent quality 
are no longer statistically significant, though their magnitudes change very little.  
In unreported regressions, we examine the influence of repeat entrepreneurs.   
“Serial entrepreneurs,” who work at multiple entrepreneurial firms, are said to be 
important in many industries.  It is reasonable to worry that serial entrepreneurs drive our 
results that firms based in Silicon Valley and Massachusetts and backed by venture 
capitalists spawn more.  That is, these firms many not teach their employees how to be 
entrepreneurs or expose them to networks, or even select for entrepreneurial types.   
Instead, firms with these characteristics may tend to be younger and more likely to have 
been founded in the recent past by entrepreneurs.  These entrepreneurs may then leave 
then to start other firms, leading to the appearance that these firms are more prolific 
spawners. 
We thus repeat the analysis, dropping cases where an entrepreneur had been 
involved with a previous venture-backed firm.  To do this, we create an identifier for 
each entrepreneur, researching the sources noted above to determine whether a “Jim 
Joyce” and a “James Joyce” in the VentureOne database are really the same person.  In 
all, the elimination of repeat entrepreneurs leads to the elimination of 9.7% of the 
observations, where the entrepreneur was involved as a founder or key officer in a 
previous venture-backed firm.  Of the repeat entrepreneurs in the sample, 83% are 
involved with two firms, 13% with three, 3% with four, and less than one percent with 
five or more firms. 
The deletions have little impact on the results.  Neither the magnitude nor the 
statistical significance of the key results presented in Table IV changes.  Similarly, when   23 
 
we repeat the analyses reported in later tables, the deletion of the repeat entrepreneurs has 
little impact. 
 
B. The Characteristics of Firms that Spawn 
In the sample of 1370 companies that patent in categories 2 and 3, 515 companies 
spawn at least one venture capital backed firm and 855 spawn none.  What are the factors 
that determine whether a firm spawns at least one firm? To address this question, we 
report the results of regressing a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm 
spawns at all on the same set of regressors as those reported in Table IV.  Although we 
report the ordinary least squares estimates in Table V, the logit results are substantively 
similar. 
Not surprisingly, firms with more patents in categories 2 and 3 are more likely to 
spawn a venture capital backed start-up.  A firm with only one patent in category 2 (the 
25
th percentile of patent quantity) has a 33.5% chance of spawning a venture capital 
backed start-up, whereas a firm with 9 patents in category 2 (the 75
th percentile) has a 
54.6% chance of spawning a venture capital backed start-up.  The estimated effect for 
patents in category 3 is similar in magnitude. Patenting in the other patent categories—
particularly in categories 5 and 6—tends to reduce the probability of spawning.   
The estimated effects of the critical variables of interest—prior venture capital 
backing, location, and focus—are all large and statistically significant.  The predicted 
probability of spawning any start-up is 20.2% higher for venture capital backed public 
companies than for firms that were not venture capital backed.  The empirical model 
predicts that non-venture capital backed public firms have a 33.0% probability of   24 
 
spawning at least one company, while a venture capital backed public company has a 
53.1% chance of spawning such a firm.  The estimated effects are similar in magnitude 
for firms located in Silicon Valley and Massachusetts.  Firms located outside of either 
have a 34.7% chance of spawning at least one start-up, while a public company located in 
Silicon Valley has a 51.2% chance of spawning a start-up and one located in 
Massachusetts has a 48.4% chance of spawning a start-up.   
The estimated effect of the focus variable is somewhat smaller than those of 
location and prior venture capital backing.  A firm that is focused throughout the sample 
period has a 51.8% chance of spawning at least one start-up, while a firm that was 
diversified throughout the sample has a 43.4% chance of spawning a start-up. In 
interpreting the magnitude of the focus coefficient, however, one has to keep in mind that 
the regression also includes the number of patents outside of categories 2 and 3, which 
also measures the degree of focus.  Indeed, if one excludes the quantity of patents outside 
of categories 2 and 3, the estimated coefficient of average focus doubles in magnitude 
and is highly statistically significant in all specifications. 
With respect to patent characteristics, patent quality appears to be significantly 
and positively related to spawning at least one company, while the effect of originality is 
negative albeit statistically insignificant. 
The second column of Table V repeats this specification for spawning of 
technology intensive businesses. The results are essentially unchanged.  The last two   25 
 
columns add 2-digit SIC code industry dummies. The estimated effects change little 
across specifications, though patent quality is no longer statistically significant.
9   
 
C. The Intensity of Spawning  
In this section, we examine the intensity of spawning, conditional on the firm 
spawning at least one venture capital-financed firm.  Table VI re-estimates the 
specifications in Table IV for the 515 companies that spawn at least one start-up.  The 
main difference between the coefficients estimated in Table IV and those estimated in 
Table VI is that, although the estimated coefficient of the venture capital dummy is 
positive, its magnitude is small and statistically insignificant.  Thus, one might conclude 
that prior venture capital backing affects whether a company spawns, but not how much 
it spawns conditional on spawning.    
The estimated effects of location continue to be large, though the coefficient 
estimate of the Massachusetts dummy is now estimated imprecisely, perhaps because the 
sample size is so much smaller now.  The coefficient of focus is also positive and 
borderline statistically significant at the 5% confidence level. The estimated effect of 
quality is also positive and statistically significant.  None of these effects change 
substantially when we restrict the dependent variable to the spawning of high-tech firms 
(column 2) and add industry dummies (columns 3 and 4). 
                                                 
9Patent quality in categories 2 and 3 appears to be higher if the company patents little 
outside those categories. Thus, the negative coefficients of patenting outside categories 2 
and 3 may proxy in part for poor patent quality in categories 2 and 3.  Excluding the 
patent quantities in categories other than 2 and 3 increases the coefficient of patent 
quality, which becomes highly statistically significant. 
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D. The Determinants of Annual Spawning Levels 
  In this sub-section we analyze the determinants of spawning on an annual basis.  
As discussed above, measuring annual spawning is imprecise given the data we have 
because in some cases we do not know when the entrepreneur joined the start-up.  When 
we do not have this information, we assumed that it occurred at the founding of the start-
up.  If the start-up is founded before the spawning company goes public, then the 
observation is dropped from the sample.  This approach means that we tend 
underestimate to a greater extent the number of spawned entities from companies that 
have gone public more recently.  With this caveat in mind, we present the results of 
pooled cross-section/time series analysis in Table VII and a firm fixed effect analysis in 
Table VIII. 
  We observe the same basic pattern of results in the first column of Table VII.  
Prior venture capital backing, a Silicon Valley or Massachusetts headquarters, and focus 
are all positively related the annual spawning levels.  The effects are somewhat 
attenuated by including industry dummies and by limiting the spawning to those in 
technology-intensive industries as shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table VII.   
The last column of Table VII reports the result of the between estimator: 
regressing firm average annual spawning levels on firm averages of the regressors.  This 
approach is similar to the approach taken in Table IV, but relies on the more imprecise 
measure of annual spawning as opposed to cumulative spawning.  Although the results 
are all consistent with those observed in Table IV, the coefficients are generally more 
imprecisely estimated in Table VII.   27 
 
Table VIII reports estimates of a regression equation with firm fixed effects. We 
cannot, of course, estimate the effects of the time-invariant factors such as prior venture 
capital backing and location.  Thus, we include only those variables that change over 
time.  The main question that we can address with this approach is whether firms tend to 
spawn more when their performance and growth are relatively good or when they 
diminish. There are two alternative views.  On the one hand, spawning may be higher 
during relatively good times as employees are exposed to more entrepreneurial 
opportunities.  On the other hand, when growth slows or performance weakens one might 
expect employees to be more aggressive in pursuing outside entrepreneurial opportunities 
as the value of remaining at the company falls.   
Table VIII shows that spawning is unrelated to Q and the EBITDA measure, but it 
is negatively and significantly related to lagged 3-year sales growth.  The estimated 
coefficient, however, is small. The model implies that an increase in sales growth from 
the 25
th percentile to the 75
th percentile reduces the log quantity of spawning from 0.089 
to 0.085, a change of just 4.6%.  It is difficult to determine whether the effect is 
genuinely small or is small because of the significant measurement error in calculating 
annual spawning levels. In either case, however, the results appear to be consistent with 
the view that employees leave firms not at the peak of their growth rates, but instead 
when growth rates have fallen, i.e., employees pursue entrepreneurial opportunities 
outside their firms when the rents from staying at the firm are diminished. 
The regression also includes the logarithm of age and the firm focus measure. 
Spawning appears to decline as a firm ages; the coefficient is significant at the 10% 
confidence level.  The coefficient on the focus variable is positive, consistent with our   28 
 
earlier cross-sectional findings, but the estimated effect is statistically insignificant.  In 
this analysis with firm fixed effects, we can only identify the effect of focus through 
changes in this variable. To the extent that focus changes little over time, the empirical 
test does not have much statistical power.  
The remaining columns of the table examine slightly different specifications.  The 
second column looks at spawning in high-tech industries.  We continue to observe a 
negative relationship between spawning and sales growth. The third column includes two 
alternative measures of sales growth: mean industry sales growth over the prior three 
years and firm-specific deviations from mean sales growth.  The results indicate that it is 
the firm-specific component of sales growth that drives the relationship to spawning.    
One might be concerned that what is driving the sales growth results is that firms 
with large reductions in sales or those that go bankrupt are laying off workers, some of 
whom find new jobs and some of whom start new companies.  If this were true we would 
expect to see all of the results coming from an increase in spawning when sales drop and 
not from a decrease in spawning when sales rise.  To examine this possibility, we replace 
the continuous measure of sales growth with dummy variables for two regions of sales 
growth: sales growth greater than the 75
th percentile of sales growth and sales growth less 
than the 25
th percentile of sales growth. The inter-quartile range is excluded so the 
estimated coefficients are measured relative to this region of sales growth.  The results 
indicate that moving out of the highest quartile of sales growth is associated with 
significantly greater spawning and that moving from moderate sales growth to the lowest 
quartile of sales growth is also associated with the more spawning.  Though the 
magnitude of these coefficients is roughly the same, only the coefficient on the high sales   29 
 
growth dummy is statistically significant.  This result is inconsistent with the hypothesis 
that spawning is generated by layoffs. 
 
 
E. Relatedness of Start-up to Parent 
  
This section examines the extent to which venture capital backed start-ups enter 
businesses that are related to those of the firms from which they are spawned.  We 
undertake this analysis for two reasons.  First, we want to see whether our key findings 
are driven by unobserved differences in the technologies of the firms that spawn many 
new ventures and those that spawn relatively few new ventures.  For example, one of our 
main findings above is that public firms based in Silicon Valley or Massachusetts are 
more likely to spawn new firms, as are public firms that were themselves once venture 
capital backed.  This may simply be because firms in these regions and with prior venture 
capital backing have technologies that are of more interest to venture capitalists.  If, 
however, we find that these high spawners tend to spawn firms with technologies that are 
less related to their own technologies, it would cast some doubt on this explanation. 
The second reason to study the relatedness of the start-up to its spawning parent is 
that it can shed light on the causes of spawning.   Recall that in the Xerox example, much 
of the spawning emanated from the Palo Alto Research Center, a group that was distant 
from corporate headquarters and was pursuing technologies outside Xerox’s core 
business.  In this view, spawning occurred because headquarters was out of touch with its 
peripheral businesses.  This example would imply that Xerox-type firms—large, 
diversified corporations headquartered outside the main regions of venture capital activity   30 
 
and with no prior link to venture capital—should be more likely to spawn outside their 
core line of business. 
To investigate the relatedness of start-ups to their spawning parents, we first need 
a measure of relatedness.  One possibility is to use industry codes of the start-up and the 
spawning parent.  We reject this approach because the start-up industry codes from 
VentureOne are not Standard Industrial Classification codes used in the public company 
Compustat database.  Thus, one would have to map one set of codes into the other, an 
imprecise and coarse mapping.  Instead, we measure the relatedness of the two firms 
based on the patents of the parent company and the patents associated with the industry 
of the start-up.  This approach also has some shortcomings, not least of which is that 
many of the start-ups in our sample are not in industries that have significant numbers of 
firms with patents.   
One challenge of this approach is defining what it means for patents to be related 
to each other.  Above, it will be recalled, we employed the technology classification 
scheme developed by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg [2001], who divided the patent classes 
in the U.S. Patent Classification scheme into 36 distinct categories.  Each of these 36 
classes encompasses several U.S. patent classes.  This classification scheme, while useful 
as a control, is probably too broad for the purpose of measuring relatedness.   
To get around this difficulty, we base the analysis of relatedness on the 
International Patent Classification (IPC) scheme.  The IPC system has its origins in the 
Council of Europe's 1954 "European Convention on the International Classification of 
Patents for Invention."  The classification has been managed by an international (rather than   31 
 
a purely European) agency since 1969.  Since that year, U.S. patents have been classified by 
patent examiners according to both the U.S. and IPC schemes (WIPO [1981]).   
  The IPC has at least two advantages over the U.S. classification (upon which the 
NBER categories are based).  First, the IPC scheme is based on the usefulness of the patent 
for an industry or profession rather than being based on the structure and function of the 
patent. Thus, the IPC scheme reflects the economic importance of new inventions, as 
opposed to the technical focus of the U.S. scheme.  Second, the first four levels of the IPC 
classifications are nested.  This is in contrast with the U.S. system, where 435/40 is a subset 
of 435/39, which is in turn a subclass of 435/34, but 435/41 is not a subclass of any of these 
(USPTO [2003]).  The non-nesting of the U.S. scheme would make it inadequate for our 
relatedness measure.   
  Because the IPC classification data is not included in the NBER Patent Citations 
Data File, we obtain this information from Thomson Delphion, a data vendor.  For the 
public companies in our sample, we simply match the patents in our data to the Delphion 
database and extract the primary IPC classification.  Getting the IPC classifications on the 
start-ups in our sample was more complex because they are generally not included in the 
NBER database.
10 Thus, we identify their patents by searching for them on the USPTO 
website (www.uspto.gov). We restrict attention to start-ups in 21 industries with significant 
numbers of patents: e.g., we include wireless communications equipment and biotechnology 
but do not include business application software and physician-practice management.  There 
are 1457 entrepreneurs leaving public companies to start firms in these industries, 28.2% of 
the entrepreneurs (for which we have industry data) who leave public companies.     32 
 
  For each start-up in these industries, we record the patent numbers of the first five 
patents they received (although they usually they have fewer than five patents).  Then for 
each of the VentureOne industries, we identify all 2-digit IPC patent classes that have at 
least five percent of the patents in that industry.  For example, in wireless communication 
equipment there are four patent classes with at least 5% of the patents in the industry: 
measuring and testing (13.8%), basic electric elements (16.0%), basic electronic circuitry 
(7.5%), and electric communication technique (55.3%), collectively accounting for 92.6% 
of the patents in this industry.
11 We then normalize these patent-class percentages by the 
cumulative percentage, e.g., dividing 13.8% by 92.6% (14.9%) to get the share of the 
measuring and testing patent class in all patent classes with a greater share than 5%.  
  To measure the relatedness of the spawning company to the start-up, we calculate 
the share of the spawner’s patents that are in the main patent classes of the start-up’s 
industry.  Because some of the patent classes in the start-up industry are more common than 
others—e.g., in wireless communication equipment, electric communication technique 
patents are more common than basic electronic circuitry—we weight the patent classes in 
this calculation by their industry share described in the preceding paragraph.  For example, 
suppose the spawning company has 20 patents in all, 5 in electric communication technique 
(with a 59.7% share) and two in measuring and testing (with a 14.9% share), and the rest in 
other patent classes.  Then our measure of relatedness would be (59.7% x 5 + 14.9% x 2)/20 
= 16.4%.  The mean relatedness measure in our sample is 27.0% and the median is 22.6%. 
                                                                                                                                                 
10The assignment of CUSIPs in the NBER Patent Citations Data File was done as of 
1989.  Firms that went public after 1989 do not have an assigned CUSIP in the file. 
  
11In the 21 industries, the cumulative percentage of patents with at least a 5% industry share 
is typically between 80% and 100%.    
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  We are now ready to examine the factors that affect the relatedness of the start-up to 
the spawning parent.  As discussed above, it may be that the high spawners tend to spawn 
more simply because they have technologies that are more appropriate for venture capital.  
In this case, we would expect to see more related spawning from companies in Silicon 
Valley and Massachusetts and those that were also once venture capital backed.  The 
regressions in Table IX examine this possibility and others.  
  The dependent variable in the regression is the relatedness measure discussed above, 
while the independent variables are similar to those in the earlier regressions.  (We omit for 
obvious reasons the patent-based measures.)  We present two sets of regressions, both with 
and without industry fixed effects.  The industry dummies will control for cross-industry 
differences in our relatedness measure.
12 
  The results indicate that companies located in Silicon Valley and Massachusetts tend 
to spawn less related ventures than companies outside these areas.   This pattern is 
inconsistent with the view that the spawning patterns follow mechanically from the greater 
propensity of firms based in entrepreneurial regions to spawn more because they have 
technologies that are more relevant for venture capital investment.  We similarly find a 
negative relationship between relatedness and prior venture capital backing of the spawning 
company; the coefficient is statistically significant in the first regression but insignificant in 
the other.  This is also inconsistent with the view that the higher spawning level of venture 
capital backed firms is driven by differences in technology.  The view is also inconsistent 
                                                 
12Some industries have more patent classes represented than others.  As a result, in these 
industries the relatedness measure will tend to be lower than in industries with fewer 
patent classes represented.  Industry dummies for the spawned start-up control for the 
cross-correlation that might follow if the industries with relatively more patent classes 
also tend to be the ones that are, say, located in Silicon Valley.   34 
 
with the Xerox-type spawning as that would imply that firms located outside the 
entrepreneurial regions would tend to spawn more outside their core business. Instead, they 
seem more likely to spawn related ventures. 
  The other findings are probably more mechanical in nature.  Not surprisingly, larger 
firms and less focused firms tend to do more unrelated spawning (although the latter result 
appears only in the second regression).  High Q firms and those with high lagged sales 
growth are also more likely to spawn related ventures.  This is probably because the supply 
of good ideas in the core business is greater than in firms with low Q and low sales growth.   
  What do these results tell us about the spawning process? At this point, it is 
difficult to draw definitive conclusions, but we can offer two hypotheses that are 
consistent with the data.  One hypothesis is that firms located in Silicon Valley and 
Massachusetts are more committed to remaining focused on their core lines of business 
and exploiting opportunities in their core.  This pattern may stem from the fact that 
remaining focused is a key business value that venture capitalists try to instill in 
entrepreneurs and one that may have been critical in their success.
13  Thus, these high 
spawning entrepreneurial firms in the main regions of venture capital activity may be 
more prone than other firms to reject new business opportunities outside their core lines.  
A second hypothesis is that these firms are better than others in identifying business 
opportunities in their core areas of specialization.  In this case, venture capitalists would 
be less willing to fund new ventures from these companies because of adverse selection 
concerns.  Thus, the new ventures that emerge from these firms are more likely to be 
outside the core business.  At this point, these hypotheses remain purely speculative. We 
                                                 
13 For evidence that supports this claim, see the discussions in Gupta [2000].   35 
 
can, however, conclude that the data are inconsistent with the view that the results are 
driven by systematic differences in the technologies of the high and low spawners. 
 
III.   Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
This paper examines the determinants of entrepreneurial spawning, i.e., the 
propensity of publicly traded corporations to spawn new venture capital backed firms.  
While entrepreneurial activity has received a tremendous amount of attention from 
academic researchers and the popular press, the source of new entrepreneurial firms has 
received relatively little systematic attention.  We show that existing public companies 
are an important source of entrepreneurs for venture capital backed start-ups, particularly 
public corporations with patents in areas of interest to venture capital.  Younger firms, 
that were backed by venture capitalists themselves and that are located in the main hubs 
of venture capital activity (Silicon Valley and Massachusetts) are more likely to spawn 
new firms.  Moreover, firms focused in one main line of business are more likely to be 
the source of entrepreneurial ventures.  Firms outside of Silicon Valley and 
Massachusetts not originally backed by venture capitalists are more likely to spawn 
businesses related to their core areas of specialization. 
These findings appear to be inconsistent with the view that entrepreneurs start 
new firms in response to their frustration with large, bureaucratic companies.  Instead, 
they suggest that the breeding grounds for entrepreneurial firms are other entrepreneurial 
firms.  It is in these environments that employees learn from their co-workers about what 
it takes to start a new firm and are exposed to a network of suppliers and customers who 
are used to dealing with start-up companies.  These spawning entrepreneurial firms may   36 
 
also implicitly select for less risk averse individuals who are willing to bear the greater 
risks of starting a new firm. 
Our findings have several implications.  In particular, they suggest that 
entrepreneurial activity in a given region has increasing returns (Saxenian [1994]).   
Stimulating entrepreneurship in a region with few existing entrepreneurial firms is 
difficult; there may be many individuals with the technological know-how to start a new 
venture capital backed firm, but many fewer who know how to start new companies. In 
addition, the network of suppliers and customers may not be strong enough to support a 
new venture.
14  Policies that have sought to foster entrepreneurial and venture capital-
activity by providing capital or investment incentives may not be enough.  Instead, 
regions may need to attract firms with existing pools of workers who have the “training 
and conditioning” to become entrepreneurs. 
At the same time, the results suggest that the ultimate success (in terms of scale) 
of individual venture capital backed firms may be bounded.  The analysis shows that 
when growth slows, employees are likely to leave their firms to start new ones. Thus, 
there may be limits to how big a venture capital backed firm can get while maintaining 
their most entrepreneurial employees.  
There are a number of related research questions we plan to pursue.  We list three 
of them here. First, we hope to supplement this analysis with a survey of spawned 
entrepreneurs.  What reasons do they give for leaving their firm and starting a new one?  
How do the responses vary depending on the type of company from which the 
                                                 
14Lerner [1999] discusses the powerful political pressures that can lead to the scattering of 
venture capital funding across regions, as well as presenting evidence consistent with this 
view from one government program to finance small high-technology businesses.    37 
 
entrepreneur was spawned?  Second, how does spawning affect the parent?  In particular, 
does it have a negative effect on growth and performance of the spawning firm as its 
most creative employees leave to start new ventures?  Finally, how do the characteristics 
of the spawning firms affect the success of the new ventures?  For example, are 
entrepreneurs from more successful spawning firms more or less likely to be successful 
themselves? And, how do the characteristics of the spawning firm’s patents affect the 
likelihood of success of the new venture? 
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Table I 
Summary of Entrepreneurs 
 
The sample is based on Venture One’s database of 15,297 founders of 5,112 venture capital backed start-
ups who received venture capital financings from 1986 to 1999.  The previous employment history of the 
founders is tabulated. Public companies are those identified from Compustat. The fourth column lists the 
number of founders who are the CEO, President, or Chief Technology Officer of the start-up.  The fifth 





















Fraction from Public 
Cos. When We Have 
Previous Company 
Identified 
1986 483  221 144  268 145  30.0%  45.9% 
1987 628  260 171  325 196  31.2%  43.6% 
1988 694  267 172  359 229  33.0%  44.2% 
1989 721  292 176  392 246  34.1%  43.6% 
1990 843  333 214  463 295  35.0%  44.3% 
1991 840  345 222  484 307  36.5%  45.1% 
1992 1065  408  237  567 342  32.1%  41.4% 
1993 1016  384  221  606 380  37.4%  46.3% 
1994 1172  446  253  747 368  31.4%  41.3% 
1995 1290  527  257  906 417  32.3%  41.4% 
1996 1623  680  372  1236 599 36.9%  44.6% 
1997 1448  669  361  1109 535 36.9%  42.6% 
1998 1747  809  365  1376 692 39.6%  45.0% 
1999 1717  804  232  1396 717 41.8%  46.5% 
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Table II 
Summary of Information on Previous Employer of Founders 
 
The sample is derived from public companies listed in Compustat during the period 1986-1999. A spawned 
entrepreneur is an employee who leaves a public company to start a venture capital backed firm. Data on 
founders come from the VentureOne database of 15,297 founders of 5,112 venture capital backed start-ups 
during the period 1986-1999.  Panel A lists all public companies that spawn at least ten entrepreneurial 
teams during the sample period, 1986-1999, and the number of entrepreneurial teams they spawn during the 
sample period.  (Multiple individuals departing to a single firm are regarded as a single entrepreneurial 
team.) Panel B lists all industries in which public companies spawn at least 20 entrepreneurs in total and the 
number of entrepreneurs they spawn. 
 
Panel A: Top Public Spawning Companies 
 
Company 
Number of Spawned 
Entrepreneurial Teams    Company 
Number of Spawned 
Entrepreneurial Teams
IBM 70    Nortel  Networks  17
AT&T 60    Unisys  17
Sun Microsystems  55    National Semiconductor  17
Apple Computer  48    Advanced Micro Devices  16
Hewlett-Packard 46    Mentor  Graphics  15
Oracle 41    Cirrus  Logic  14
General Electric  37    Genentech  14
Microsoft  30    Bristol Myers Squibb  14
Xerox 29    Raychem  14
Baxter  29    Dun & Bradstreet  14
Intel 28    SmithKline  Beecham  13
Disney 28    MCI  13
Silicon Graphics  27    Pfizer  13
Lotus Development Corp.  26    Texas Instruments  13
Motorola 25    Legent  12
DEC 24    Tandem  Computer  12
Cadence Design Systems  21    Bank of America  11
Johnson & Johnson  21    Peoplesoft  11
Verizon 19    Morgan  Stanley  11
Novell 18    Adaptec  11  43 
 
Table II (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Top Three Digit Industries for Spawners 
 
Industry 
Number of Spawned 
Entrepreneurial Teams 
Computer Programming and Data Processing  1009 
Computer and Office Equipment  588 
Drugs 348 
Communication Equipment  212 
Surgical, Medical, and Dental Instruments  204 
Electronic Components and Accessories  185 
Telephone Communications  178 
Laboratory, Analytical, and Optical Equipment  83 
Security Brokers, Dealers, And Flotation  61 
Radio And Television Broadcasting Stations  52 
Commercial Banks  50 
Non-Store Retailers  30 
Special Industry Machinery, Except Metalworking  24 
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Table III 
Characteristics of Public Spawners vs. Non-spawners 
 
The sample is derived from public companies listed in Compustat during the period 1986-1999. Spawners 
are identified as those public companies in which at least one employee left to start a venture capital backed 
firm.  Data on founders come from the VentureOne database of 15,297 founders of 5,112 venture capital 
backed start-ups during the period 1986-1999.  The table compares the characteristics of public companies 
that spawn at least one entrepreneur during the sample period 1986-1999 (the first three columns) to the 
characteristics of public companies that never spawn during the sample period (the second three columns).  
All dollar figures are in millions of 1999 dollars.  Patent category 2 refers to computer and communication 
patents as classified in the NBER Patent Citations Data File and category 3 refers to medical and drug 
patents.  The differences in the means are all statistically significant based on heteroskedasticity-consistent 
t-statistics that adjust for non-independence of observations of the same firm over time. 
 
  Spawners  Non-spawners 
 Median  Mean  Observations  Median  Mean  Observations 
Sales ($MMs)  $185.2  $3,428.6  515  $116.1  $1,343.3  855 
Assets ($MMs)  $191.7  $4,949.1  515  $100.5  $1,732.6  855 
Employees (000s)  23.1  44.2  515  0.8  8.0  855 
Winsorized Sales Growth*  19.3% 52.6%  515  11.2%  37.6%  855 
Winsorized Tobin’s Q*  2.18  2.75  515  1.71  2.54  855 
EBITDA/Assets 0.111  0.058  515  0.107 0.054  855 
Venture Capital-Backed    35.5%  515   12.2% 855 
Silicon Valley    19.8%  515   5.9% 855 
Massachusetts   9.9%  515   5.9% 855 
Number of Spawned 
Entrepreneurs  2 4.07 
 
515    
 
Any patents    28.4%  515   28.4% 855 
Number of Patents in 
Category 2  4  137.5 
 
515 2  15.9 
 
855 
Number of Patents in 
Category 3  0  51.2 
 
515  0 10.8 
 
855 
Patent Quality  0.618  1.336  515  -0.922 -0.606  855 
Patent Originality  0.019  0.019  515  0.062  0.059  855 
 
* Observations with greater than the 99
th percentile are coded as being at this level. 
 Table IV 
Regression Analyses of Spawning Levels 
 
The table presents regression results for the cumulative number of spawned entrepreneurs for each firm in our sample.  The sample is 
derived from public companies listed in Compustat during the period 1986-1999 with patents in either Computer and Communications 
or Drugs and Medical based on the NBER Patent Citations Data File classification scheme.  The dependent variable in the regressions 
is the natural logarithm of the cumulative number of venture capital backed entrepreneurs spawned over the whole sample period.  
The information on entrepreneurs comes from a sample of 15,297 founders of 5,112 venture capital backed start-ups in the 
VentureOne database of venture capital financing who received venture capital financing between 1986 and 1999.  Independent 
variables include the natural logarithm of inflation-adjusted firm size, the firm’s sales growth over the previous three years winsorized 
at the 99
th percentile, Tobin’s Q for the firm winsorized at the 99
th percentile, the natural logarithm of patents in six patent categories, 
dummy variables indicating whether the firm was backed by venture capitalists, dummy variables indicating if the firm was located in 
Silicon Valley or Massachusetts, measures for the firm’s patent originality, the natural logarithm of firm age, and a dummy variable 
that equals one if the firm reports only one industry segment in Compustat.  All regressions include year dummies for every year that 
the firm is in the sample, though the coefficients are not shown; some include industry fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-
statistics in parentheses adjust for non-independence of observations of the same firm over time. 
 
  Dependent Variable: Log of Number of Entrepreneurs Spawned 
 Total  Spawning 
Technology 
Spawning  Total Spawning 
Technology 
Spawning 
Independent Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 


































































Mean Winsorized Sales Growth Over 
Previous Year








Mean Winsorized Tobin's Q









































































Number of Observations  1,370  1,370  1,370  1,370 
Adjusted R-squared  0.418  0.403  0.433  0.400 
Industry Fixed Effects  No  No   Yes  Yes 
 
* Observations with greater than the 99
th percentile are coded as equal to the 99
th percentile. 
      
 
Table V 
Regression Analyses of Likelihood of Doing Any Spawning 
 
The table presents regressions of the probability of a sample firm having any spawning activity.  The sample is derived from public 
companies listed in Compustat during the period 1986-1999 with patents in either Computer and Communications or Drugs and 
Medical based on the NBER Patent Citations Data File classification scheme.  The dependent variable in the regressions is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the firm ever spawns at least one venture capital backed entrepreneurs.  The information on entrepreneurs 
comes from a sample of 15,297 founders of 5,112 venture capital backed start-ups in the VentureOne database of venture capital 
financing who received venture capital financing between 1986 and 1999.  Independent variables include the natural logarithm of 
inflation-adjusted firm size, the firm’s sales growth over the previous three years winsorized at the 99
th percentile, Tobin’s Q for the 
firm winsorized at the 99
th percentile, the natural logarithm of patents in six patent categories, dummy variables indicating whether the 
firm was backed by venture capitalists, dummy variables indicating if the firm was located in Silicon Valley or Massachusetts, 
measures for the firm’s patent originality, the natural logarithm of firm age, and a dummy variable that equals one if the firm reports 
only one industry segment in Compustat.  All regressions include year dummies for each year that the firm is in our sample, though 
the coefficients are not shown; some include industry fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses adjust for 
non-independence of observations of the same firm over time. 
 
  Dependent Variable: Dummy Variable Indicating Any Spawning 
 Total  Spawning 
Technology 
Spawning  Total Spawning 
Technology 
Spawning 
Independent Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 


































































Mean Winsorized Sales Growth Over 
Previous Year








Mean Winsorized Tobin's Q









































































Number of Observations  1,370  1,370  1,370  1,370 
Adjusted R-squared  0.275  0.300  0.277  0.292 
Industry Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  Yes 
 
* Observations with greater than the 99
th percentile are coded as equal to the 99
th percentile.    
 
Table VI 
Regression Analyses of Cumulative Spawning Levels Conditional on Any Spawning 
 
The table presents regressions of the cumulative spawning rates for firms, conditional on the firms doing any spawning during our 
sample period.  The sample is derived from public companies listed in Compustat during the period 1986-1999 with patents in either 
Computer and Communications or Drugs and Medical based on the NBER Patent Citations Data File classification scheme.  The 
dependent variable in the regressions is the natural logarithm of the cumulative number of venture capital backed entrepreneurs 
spawned over the entire sample period from these public companies.  The information on entrepreneurs comes from a sample of 
15,297 founders of 5,112 venture capital backed start-ups in the VentureOne database of venture capital financing who received 
venture capital financing between 1986 and 1999.  Independent variables include the natural logarithm of inflation-adjusted firm size, 
the firm’s sales growth over the previous three years winsorized at the 99
th percentile, Tobin’s Q for the firm winsorized at the 99
th 
percentile, the natural logarithm of patents in six patent categories, dummy variables indicating whether the firm was backed by 
venture capitalists, dummy variables indicating if the firm was located in Silicon Valley or Massachusetts, measures for the firm’s 
patent originality, the natural logarithm of firm age, and a dummy variable that equals one if the firm reports only one industry 
segment in Compustat.  All regressions include year dummies for each year that the firm is in our sample, though the coefficients are 
not shown; some include industry fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses adjust for non-independence of 
observations of the same firm over time. 
 
  Dependent Variable: Conditional Spawning Level 
 Total  Spawning 
Technology 
Spawning Total  Spawning 
Technology 
Spawning 
Independent Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 


































































Mean Winsorized Sales Growth Over 
Previous Year








Mean Winsorized Tobin's Q









































































Number of Observations  515  428  515  428 
Adjusted R-squared  0.440  0.406  0.443  0.401 
Industry Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  Yes 
 
* Observations with greater than the 99
th percentile are coded as equal to the 99
th percentile. 
    
 
Table VII 
Cross Sectional Regression Analyses of Annual Spawning Levels 
 
The regression are pooled cross-sectional regressions or the between estimators from fixed effects regressions of annual spawning 
levels for publicly traded firms.  The sample is derived from public companies listed in Compustat during the period 1986-1999 with 
patents in either Computer and Communications or Drugs and Medical based on the NBER Patent Citations Data File classification 
scheme.  The dependent variable in the regressions is the natural logarithm of the number of venture capital backed entrepreneurs 
spawned in a given year from these public companies.  The information on entrepreneurs comes from a sample of 15,297 founders of 
5,112 venture capital backed start-ups in the VentureOne database of venture capital financing who received venture capital financing 
between 1986 and 1999.  Independent variables include the natural logarithm of inflation-adjusted firm size, the firm’s sales growth 
over the previous three years winsorized at the 99
th percentile, Tobin’s Q for the firm winsorized at the 99
th percentile, the natural 
logarithm of patents in six patent categories, dummy variables indicating whether the firm was backed by venture capitalists, dummy 
variables indicating if the firm was located in Silicon Valley or Massachusetts, measures for the firm’s patent originality, the natural 
logarithm of firm age, and a dummy variable that equals one if the firm reports only one industry segment in Compustat.  All 
regressions include year dummies, though the coefficients are not shown; some include industry fixed effects. All regressions include 
year dummies, though the coefficients are not shown; some include industry or firm fixed effects.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-
statistics in parentheses adjust for non-independence of observations of the same firm over time. 
 
  Dependent Variable: Annual Spawning Level 
  Total Spawning  Total Spawning 
Technology 
Spawning 
Between Estimates from Firm Fixed 
Effects Regressions of Annual  
Total Spawning Levels 
Independent Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
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Mean Winsorized Sales Growth 


















Mean Winsorized Tobin's Q









































































Number of Observations  10,914  10,875  10,875  10,914 
Adjusted R-squared  0.227  0.249  0.217  0.342 
Industry Fixed Effects  No  Yes  Yes  NA 
 
* Observations with greater than the 99
th percentile are coded as equal to the 99
th percentile. 
    
 
Table VIII 
Firm Fixed-Effects Regression Analyses of Annual Spawning Levels 
 
The table presents the firm fixed-effects regressions for the sample of publicly traded spawning firms.  The sample is derived from 
public companies listed in Compustat during the period 1986-1999 with patents in either Computer and Communications or Drugs and 
Medical based on the NBER Patent Citations Data File classification scheme.  The dependent variable in the regressions is the natural 
logarithm of the number of venture capital backed entrepreneurs spawned in a given year from these public companies.  The 
information on entrepreneurs comes from a sample of 15,297 founders of 5,112 venture capital backed start-ups in the VentureOne 
database of venture capital financing who received venture capital financing between 1986 and 1999.  Independent variables include 
the natural logarithm of inflation-adjusted firm size, the firm’s sales growth over the previous three years winsorized at the 99
th 
percentile, the firm’s industry sales growth over the previous three years winsorized at the 99
th percentile and deviations from that 
industry sales growth over the previous three years winsorized at the 99
th percentile, Tobin’s Q for the firm Winsorized at the 99
th 
percentile, the natural logarithm of patents in six patent categories, the natural logarithm of firm age, and a dummy variable that equals 
one if the firm reports only one industry segment in Compustat.  All regressions include year dummies, though the coefficients are not 
shown; some include industry or firm fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses adjust for non-
independence of observations of the same firm over time. 
 
  Dependent Variable: Annual Spawning Level 
 Total  Spawning 
Technology 
Spawning  Total Spawning  Total Spawning
Independent Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
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Winsorized Deviation from Industry Sales 
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[0.37]   
Sales Growth of Firm in the Highest 
Quartile of Sales Growth
 
   
-0.0121 
[-2.09] 
Sales Growth of Firm in the Lowest 
Quartile of Sales Growth     
0.0101 
[1.49] 








Mean Winsorized Tobin's Q
































Number of Observations  10,929  10,929  10,929  10,929 
Adjusted R-squared  0.476  0.438  0.476  0.476 
 
* Observations with greater than the 99




     
 
Table IX 
Regression Analyses of Likelihood of Related Spawning 
 
The table presents regressions of the degree of relatedness between a spawning and spawned firm.  The sample is derived from public 
companies listed in Compustat during the period 1986-1999 with patents in either Computer and Communications or Drugs and 
Medical based on the NBER Patent Citations Data File classification scheme.  The dependent variable is the measure of relatedness 
described in the text. Independent variables include the natural logarithm of inflation-adjusted firm size, the firm’s sales growth over 
the previous three years winsorized at the 99
th percentile, Tobin’s Q for the firm winsorized at the 99
th percentile, dummy variables 
indicating whether the firm was backed by venture capitalists, dummy variables indicating if the firm was located in Silicon Valley or 
Massachusetts, and a dummy variable that equals one if the firm reports only one industry segment in Compustat.  All regressions 
include year dummies for each year that the firm is in our sample, though the coefficients are not shown; one includes industry fixed 
effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses adjust for non-independence of observations of the same firm over 
time. 
 
  Dependent Variable: Measure of Relatedness 
  Basic Specification  Industry Dummies 
Independent Variables  (1)  (2) 




Mean Winsorized Sales Growth Over 
Previous Year




Mean Winsorized Tobin's Q

























Number of Observations  844  844 
Adjusted R-squared  0.228  0.541 
Industry Fixed Effects  No  Yes 
 
* Observations with greater than the 99
th percentile are coded as equal to the 99
th percentile. 
 
 